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Abstract Although the Supreme Court of the United States
has never developed a single clear test for determining what
kinds of state action violate the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment, schools that attempt to teach or introduce
intelligent design as a purportedly scientific alternative to
evolution likely fall afoul of the First Amendment's
commands. Under the Court's most relevant precedent,
Edwards v. Aguillard, teaching intelligent design violates
the Establishment Clause because, among other things,
there is an enormous disconnect between the purpose of
teaching intelligent design and its effect. Moreover, public
school teachers do not possess any First Amendment right
of academic freedom to disregard the clear instructions of a
school principal or district not to teach or introduce
intelligent design in their classrooms.

cases find their way to the courts. Despite these uncertainties,
however, it is quite clear that teaching intelligent design in
public science classrooms would raise serious constitutional
problems in most, if not all cases, and that schools that adopt
intelligent design policies run a substantial risk of losing in
the courts. Here I will canvass the legal issues relevant to the
adoption of an intelligent design policy in the public schools,
and I will suggest that such policies, in most cases, should be
found unconstitutional. I consider primarily the constitutional
ramifications of a school board that adopts a formal
intelligent design policy, but it is also worth noting that
many of the same arguments can be applied to an individual
teacher who determines on his or her own to teach intelligent
design.
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Church–State Relations and the First Amendment

Teaching intelligent design in our nation’s public school
science classrooms is no doubt bad educational policy, but is it
also unconstitutional? The only court to consider the issue so
far answered with a resounding yes (Kitzmiller v. Dover), but
since its decision lacks precedential authority outside a very
small area in Pennsylvania, the question is still a live one. It
is hard to say with any certainty what some other court might
do if faced with another challenge to an intelligent design
policy. The Supreme Court’s religion clause jurisprudence is
notoriously vague and indeterminate, and a lot will necessarily turn on the specific circumstances of whatever case or
J. D. Wexler (*)
Boston University,
Boston, MA, USA
e-mail: jaywex@bu.edu

The first sentence of the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution says that “Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof.” The first part of the sentence is
usually called the “Establishment Clause”; the second part
is known as the “Free Exercise Clause.” Although the
sentence speaks only in terms of what Congress may or
may not do, the Supreme Court has long held that the First
Amendment in fact applies to all levels of government,
including state and local bodies. Like many parts of the
Constitution, the religion clauses of the First Amendment
can be interpreted in many ways, and so the courts have
had to struggle over the past century to clarify what kinds
of actions government can and cannot take with respect to
religion. It would be impossible in the space provided here
to provide any kind of a comprehensive summary of the
history of church–state law, so I will limit myself to a very
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brief sketch of the current law regarding the establishment
of religion, with specific emphasis on the Supreme Court
decisions that have set out the legal tests most relevant for
the constitutional evaluation of any policy involving
intelligent design.
The most general statement of Establishment Clause
law is the so-called Lemon test. According to this test,
first articulated by the Supreme Court in a case called
Lemon v. Kurtzman, the government may not take any
action that has the primary purpose of advancing religion,
has the primary effect of advancing religion, or fosters an
excessive entanglement between religion and the state.
This general test, however, creates more questions than it
answers. For example: How do we determine the government’s purpose? What constitutes an advancement of
religion? How much entanglement is excessive? And what
counts as entanglement anyway? As a result, the Court
rarely looks only to this test to decide cases. Instead, the
Court applies more specific variations or elaborations of
the Lemon test depending on what kind of challenge it is
considering.
One such elaboration that is particularly relevant for
considering the constitutionality of intelligent design policies is the endorsement test. Created by Justice Sandra Day
O’Connor in a concurring opinion in 1984, and adopted by
five members of the Court five years later in a case involving
various holiday displays near a Pittsburgh courthouse, the
test asks whether a “reasonable observer” would feel that the
government has sent a “message to non-adherents that they
are outsiders, not full members of the political community,
and an accompanying message to adherents that they are
insiders, favored members of the political community”
(County of Allegheny v. ACLU). In determining whether
the government has violated the test, the Court considers
the entire context of the government’s action, particularly the
action’s historical context, and measures the perception of
“the reasonable observer,” who “must be deemed aware of
the history and context of the community and forum in
which the religious display appears” (Capitol Square
Review & Advisory Board v. Pinette).
The Court has twice struck down attempts by states to
interfere with evolution education. In 1968, in Epperson v.
Arkansas, the Court invalidated an Arkansas law that
prohibited teachers from teaching evolution, finding that
the law was motivated by a completely religious purpose.
About twenty years later, the Court held that Louisiana’s
equal time law, requiring schools to teach so-called creation
science whenever presenting evolution, also violated the
Establishment Clause. This decision, Edwards v. Aguillard,
is the most relevant statement by the Court to date for
considering whether a public school can constitutionally
introduce the concept of intelligent design into science
classes.
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As a formal matter, the Court in Edwards decided
against the statute for the same reason it invalidated the
statute at issue in Epperson: It found that the statute lacked
any secular purpose. But because the state had in fact
claimed a secular purpose—promoting the academic freedom of public school teachers—the Court engaged in
extended analysis on the way to concluding that this
claimed purpose was in fact a sham. In the course of this
discussion, the Court relied on several key facts and
findings: (1) the poor means–end relationship of the statute,
that is, the poor fit between the goal of promoting academic
freedom and what the statute actually did; (2) the historic
link between religion and critiques of evolution; (3) the
singling out of evolution from among all possible topics in
the curriculum for reform; (4) the favoring of creation
science under certain provisions of the statute; and (5)
statements from the legislative history indicating the
legislature acted with the intent to promote religion.
Because the Court found that the statute was unconstitutional on Lemon’s first prong, it did not also consider
whether the statute had the unconstitutional effect of
endorsing or promoting religion. But given the Court’s
skeptical attitude and the fact that the five factors examined
by the Court probably equally supported a finding of
endorsement or promotion, the Court most likely would
have struck down the statute on these grounds as well, had
it considered them. Since it found that the legislature had
acted with a religious purpose to promote and endorse
religion, the Court could only have found a lack of actual
endorsement or promotion if it had found that the
legislature had not in fact accomplished its goals by issuing
the law, a conclusion that seems quite unlikely given the
Court's attitude toward the statute.
Finally, it is worth noting that the Supreme Court has
been particularly vigilant in policing the Establishment
Clause within the public schools. Specifically, in the eight
cases in which the Court assessed the merits of an
Establishment Clause challenge to an arguably religious
practice (school prayer, moment of silence, and so on) in a
public school, it has struck that practice down as
unconstitutional. (The eight cases are Edwards, Epperson,
School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, Engel
v. Vitale, Stone v. Graham, Wallace v. Jaffree, Lee v.
Weisman, and Santa Fe Independent School District v.
Doe.) The Court has given a variety of reasons for strictly
applying the Establishment Clause in the public school
context, including the compulsory nature of public
education, the authoritative role that teachers play in the
classroom, and the impressionable nature of young
children and adolescents. As a result, any attempt to
introduce intelligent design into the public school science
classroom will have to pass a high hurdle to survive
constitutional challenge.
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Intelligent Design: Is it Religion?
Logically, the first issue to consider is whether intelligent
design is religion, as that term is used in the First
Amendment. If it is, then schools may not advance,
endorse, or promote it in the classroom. Perhaps surprisingly, the Supreme Court has never defined the term
religion in the First Amendment, although it has hinted in
some non-binding language that the term should be
understood quite broadly to encompass, for example, more
than traditional Judeo-Christian monotheism (Torcaso v.
Watkins, 495n11). Lower courts struggling to give the term
some meaning have adopted a test that asks whether the
belief system in question is a comprehensive viewpoint
that addresses fundamental questions and is associated
with certain formal and external signs common to most
religions, such as holidays, symbols, and professional
clergy. (For example, this test was adopted by the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals in Africa v. Pennsylvania.)
Defenders of intelligent design’s constitutionality (such
as Beckwith 2003: 152) have argued that under this
framework intelligent design is not a religion; they argue
that intelligent design lacks the external attributes of most
religions, is an isolated teaching rather than a comprehensive one, and does not address “fundamental and ultimate
questions having to do with deep and imponderable
matters.” Although these writers may underestimate the
extent to which intelligent design addresses fundamental
questions, they are probably on strong ground to conclude
that under this particular test, intelligent design does not
constitute a religion.
This test, however, cannot be the right test for evaluating
the constitutionality of intelligent design. If it were, then
schools could also encourage students to pray, since the
concept of prayer, by itself, does not meet the three-part test
either. Likewise, if the analysis of the intelligent design
supporters were correct, then schools could teach the truth
of karma, sin, reincarnation, or any other indisputably
religious concepts because none of these concepts by itself
would meet the three-part test. These obvious examples
demonstrate that courts must apply a different test when the
issue is whether some concept, practice, or belief in
isolation is religious, as opposed to whether some integrated belief system counts as a religion.
The courts have not explicitly recognized this problem,
but the right analysis for the question would ask whether
the concept, practice, or belief in question resonates in
religion rather than in some other area of inquiry, such that
a reasonable person would understand the government
promotion of the concept as a promotion or endorsement of
a religious practice or belief. Reasonable inquiries under
such a test would include whether an average person would
associate the concept primarily with religion; whether the
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concept is an important aspect of the religious traditions
that people are generally familiar with; whether people also
commonly associate the concept with ideas or belief
systems that are not generally viewed as religious; and
whether, if the concept is associated with non-religious
belief systems, it is more prominently associated with those
belief systems than with religious traditions.
Although application of this test might be difficult for
some potentially religious concepts, intelligent design is in
fact quite easy to analyze under the framework. Does
intelligent design resonate in religion? Does the notion that
an intelligent designer created the world and all of its
inhabitants resonate in religion? Of course it does. The
intelligent design of the universe is the core concept of the
major prominent Western religions, without which those
religious traditions would not be recognizable. Most
reasonable people would associate the intelligent design
of the universe with religion. No significant nonreligious
school of thought has an intelligent designer or creator as a
core concept. And the Supreme Court in Edwards specifically characterized as a “religious viewpoint” the belief
that “a supernatural being created mankind.” Thus, it seems
clear that intelligent design should be considered a
“religion” for First Amendment purposes.
Whether intelligent design constitutes “religion” may,
however, be largely beside the point. After all, although
public schools cannot promote or advance or endorse or
teach the truth of any religion, they are perfectly free to
teach about religion. They can teach about Christianity,
about Judaism, about Hinduism, and about Confucianism,
and there are many good reasons for schools to teach these
subjects. (For an extended argument that schools should
teach about religion to prepare them for civic life in a
nation [and world] populated by believers of many religious
traditions, see Wexler 2002b.) So, if public schools can
teach about religion, why shouldn’t they be able to teach
about intelligent design? To some degree they certainly can.
For example, if a public school chose to teach about the
philosophical claims of intelligent design in a philosophy of
science class, the intelligent design movement in a current
affairs class, or about the truth claims of intelligent design
in a comparative religion class, most likely these choices
would not pose a constitutional problem, assuming that
intelligent design is not presented as a true account—
scientific, religious, philosophical, or otherwise—of the
world’s creation.
Things are very different, however, when schools
propose to teach intelligent design as a legitimate alternative scientific theory to evolution. For one thing, because
science teachers are generally expected to present the best
thinking in the field as the current state of knowledge,
without pointing out each and every dissenting view, even
well-intentioned teachers trying to paint a balanced picture
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may end up leaving students with the impression that
intelligent design is in fact true. This problem is exacerbated by the lack of adequate materials for teachers to use to
teach evolution and intelligent design together in an
objective fashion. Most important, however, even a policy
that urges schools to use an objective approach to teaching
about intelligent design might constitute an unconstitutional
endorsement of religion or be motivated by a predominantly religious purpose, such that the very adoption of the
policy would be unconstitutional. Whether this would be
the case turns in large part on the proper understanding of
the Supreme Court’s decision in Edwards, to which I now
turn.

Intelligent Design and the Edwards Case
Recall that in striking down Louisiana’s equal-time-forcreation-science law, the Supreme Court looked to a
number of factors in determining that the legislature’s
articulated secular purpose was a sham. Among those
factors were the poor fit between that purported purpose
and the actual language of the statute, the singling out of
evolution for special treatment, the long history of religious
opposition to evolution, and statements from the law’s
sponsors indicating an intent to promote religion. As it
turns out, the intelligent design movement shares many of
the same problems that doomed the creation-science
movement over twenty years ago. Stated strongly, the
Establishment Clause case against intelligent design can be
summarized in terms of the Edwards factors as follows:
Against a long and visible history of clearly religious
opposition to teaching evolution, once more a movement
arrives that speaks in explicitly religious terms and singles
out evolution from among all topics in the school
curriculum for change, with the stated goal of informing
students about a significant scientific controversy which in
fact does not exist. What message would a school send to a
reasonable observer by embracing such a movement? Most
likely, the reasonable observer would understand that the
government has reformed the curriculum for religious
reasons, which is precisely what the Court in Edwards said
the government may not do. The following discussion
focuses on three of intelligent design’s most damaging
constitutional problems: its singling out of evolution
education for reform, its explicitly religious background,
and its status as unsuccessful science.
First, like the iterations before it, the intelligent design
movement singles out evolution as the one subject in the
entire curriculum that deserves criticism. This demonstrates
that the real intention of the movement is not to promote
any secular goal but rather to promote a religious
viewpoint, and it also ensures that the message received
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by reasonable observers will be the same. To understand
this better, consider what a policy that truly sought to
promote real secular goals would look like. For example, if
reformers sincerely intended to make sure that students
understand minority views on science, or the process of
science as a discipline that is in constant flux as new
discoveries are made and explanations developed, then why
would those reformers focus exclusively on evolution (or
even exclusively on targets of political conservatives, like
global warming along with evolution) rather than on
subjects throughout the entire science curriculum? Indeed,
several real-world proposals exist to teach students about
the scientific process and minority views across various
scientific disciplines. An example is the program developed
at the University of Wisconsin-Stout called “The Stout
Science Program for Educators,” which, according to its
mission statement, “is designed to provide teachers with the
tools necessary to improve student competencies in science
and critical thinking…by using good science and pseudoscience (or false science) as an instructional tool.” (The
program’s website can be found at http://physics.uwstout.
edu/stoutsci/.) But intelligent design supporters do not
appear to be rushing to support these efforts.
Likewise, although intelligent design proponents often
complain that the public school curriculum is not neutral
with respect to religious views, a complaint that is at the
same time both true and inevitable, they surely are not
proposing to reform the curriculum so that it is completely
neutral with regard to every religious belief held by anyone
in the community. For example, some religious traditions
teach that the world was created by numerous deities or by
an animal such as a turtle or a raven, often in a very specific
fashion that does not involve the simple creation of life by
an intelligent agent. (For a description of a wide variety of
creation stories, see Leeming and Leeming 1994.) Teaching
intelligent design is no more neutral with regard to these
specific creation beliefs than teaching evolution is, but one
does not find intelligent design advocates suggesting that
public schools should teach a wide variety of creation
stories in order to maintain neutrality in the public school
curriculum.
The troubling focus on singling out evolution for reform
signals an important potential constitutional problem for the
emerging “arguments against evolution” movement, which
seems, in the aftermath of Kitzmiller, to be in the process of
becoming a major battleground for future evolution wars
(see, e.g., Matzke and Gross 2006 on the battle over the
2005 Kansas science standards). Although a full constitutional analysis of this movement falls beyond the scope of
this article, it is worth pointing out that, as with the creation
science and intelligent design movements, the notion that
schools should teach minority critiques of only one specific
scientific theory rather than all similarly situated theories is
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vastly underinclusive with regard to any possible secular
goal that could be articulated to support it. As a result,
anyone trying to understand why some public school
system would make a conscious decision to teach widely
rejected criticisms of only evolution (and not, say, gravity,
or the roundness of the earth, or some other widely
accepted scientific notion) would surely surmise that the
reform was intended to promote the clearly religious view
that evolution is an unconvincing scientific position.
Second, as with past efforts to discredit evolution, the
intelligent design movement also often speaks in explicitly
religious terms, thus compounding the religious message
that any reasonable observer would take from the attempt to
adopt an intelligent design policy in the public schools.
There are two general ways that the movement can be
understood as speaking in religious terms. First, the
founders and leaders of the movement—people such as
Phillip Johnson and William Dembski and organizations
such as the Discovery Institute—often talk generally about
intelligent design using religious language. Second, the
political decision-makers who make the actual decision to
implement some particular intelligent design policy in a
specific public school or school system may also speak in
explicitly religious terms during the lead-up to implementation, as well as its follow-through.
Much more can be said in concrete terms about the first
of these than the second. As the federal judge in Kitzmiller
rightly pointed out, many of the most prominent individual
and institutional supporters and developers of intelligent
design have consistently spoken about it in religious terms.
Perhaps most damning on this score is the so-called Wedge
document, which stated one goal of the intelligent design
movement as “replac[ing] materialistic explanations with
the theistic understanding that nature and human beings are
created by God.” And as made clear by Barbara Forrest at
the trial, the various drafts of the primary intelligent design
textbook Of Pandas and People demonstrate that the authors
simply replaced the terms creation and creation science with
intelligent design to avoid running afoul of the Supreme
Court’s decision in Edwards. (For the judge’s account of this
religious language, and the Wedge document in particular,
see Kitzmiller, 718–723. A comprehensive account of this
history can be found in Forrest and Gross 2003.)
Less can be said about the language used during the
deliberations over any specific intelligent design policy
because, of course, that language will differ depending on
the circumstances. It is at least theoretically possible that a
school could adopt an intelligent design policy without
talking in religious terms at all. For example, an individual
science teacher could introduce the topic into a classroom
without mentioning religion, assuming there is no contrary
school policy in place. If there is a scenario for
introducing intelligent design in a science class that could
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possibly pass constitutional muster, it would involve such
an individual teacher who sincerely thinks intelligent
design is an interesting scientific concept for reasons truly
unrelated to religion and says exactly that upon introducing
the subject. On the other hand, it seems far more probable
that most decisions to adopt intelligent design would
resemble the situation in Dover, Pennsylvania, where
supporters and school board members spoke in favor of the
policy in explicitly religious terms, with one member saying
something like, “Two thousand years ago someone died on a
cross. Can’t someone take a stand for him?” Language like
this quite obviously will weigh in favor of finding any
specific intelligent design policy unconstitutional.
It is important when analyzing religious language that is
used in support of some government policy or legislation,
however, that courts be careful not to place too high a bar
on the use of religious language during the policy-making
or legislative process. Like all individuals, government
officials possess First Amendment rights, and a liberal
democracy that treats religious citizens with respect and
equal regard should not censor too strongly the invocation
of religious beliefs that happen to coincide with some
public policy decision (for more on this point, see Wexler
2002a). A law should not find itself in constitutional
jeopardy simply because some citizens speak in its favor
in religious terms; if that were the law, neither the
abolitionist nor the civil rights movement would have fared
well in the courts. Religious statements in support of a
challenged government policy or law become problematic
only when they so suffuse the decision-making process that
they demonstrate that the law was promulgated predominantly for a religious purpose or they contribute to sending
a message to the reasonable observer that the government is
endorsing a religious belief. This is what happened, for
example, in the Dover case.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, as with the
creation-science equal-time law at issue in Edwards, the
intelligent design movement suffers from an enormous
disconnect between the movement’s means and its purported ends. To the extent that the movement argues that public
schools should teach intelligent design in science classes to
inform students of an important scientific controversy, it
fails because there is no such controversy. As its critics
have explained in detail, intelligent design has found no
success in the scientific community. That community,
including almost every major scientific organization, has
universally accepted evolution as a central theory in
biology and roundly rejected the concept of intelligent
design as an alternative to evolution. Most important,
perhaps, is intelligent design’s near total failure to make
any headway into the peer-reviewed publications that are
the gateway to scientific success. With this justification for
teaching intelligent design completely undermined by the
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facts, what possible reason could there be to teach it in
science classes, other than to discredit a theory that many
religious people find untrue and offensive? As a result, the
message sent by any school that adopts an intelligent design
policy will almost surely be that it intends to promote the
religious belief that an intelligent designer created the
universe.

The Kitzmiller Decision
As of this writing, the issue of intelligent design’s
constitutionality has been addressed by the courts only
one time. In late December 2005, Judge John E. Jones III, a
United States district court judge sitting in Harrisburg,
Pennsylvania, issued a 139-page ruling striking down as
unconstitutional an intelligent design policy adopted by the
Dover Area School Board in Dover, Pennsylvania the
previous year. The challenged policy included two parts.
First, the Board had adopted a resolution stating: “Students
will be made aware of gaps/problems in Darwin’s theory
and of other theories of evolution including, but not limited
to, intelligent design.” Second, the Board had issued a
statement, required to be read to ninth grade biology
students in the district, which said in full:
The Pennsylvania Academic Standards require students to learn about Darwin’s Theory of Evolution
and eventually to take a standardized test of which
evolution is a part.
Because Darwin’s Theory is a theory, it continues to
be tested as new evidence is discovered. The Theory
is not a fact. Gaps in the Theory exist for which there
is no evidence. A theory is defined as a well-tested
explanation that unifies a broad range of observations.
Intelligent Design is an explanation of the origin of
life that differs from Darwin’s view. The reference
book, Of Pandas and People, is available for students
who might be interested in gaining an understanding
of what Intelligent Design actually involves.
With respect to any theory, students are encouraged to
keep an open mind. The school leaves the discussion
of the Origins of Life to individual students and their
families. As a Standards-driven district, class instruction focuses upon preparing students to achieve
proficiency on Standards-based assessments.
After various parents of children in the Dover school
system sued to enjoin the policy, Judge Jones conducted a
trial over the course of six weeks to consider whether the
policy violated the Establishment Clause. His comprehensive opinion in the case of Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School
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District, finding the school board’s intelligent design policy
unconstitutional, was widely hailed as a tremendous victory
for defenders of evolution.
Judge Jones’s legal analysis proceeded in six logical steps.
First, the judge concluded, based on his analysis of precedent
from both the Third Circuit Court of Appeals (the appellate
court that reviews his decisions) and the Supreme Court, that
he would apply both the Lemon test and the endorsement test
to the school board’s actions. Second, he analyzed the
historical development of the intelligent design movement,
including its roots in medieval theology and creation
science, as well as the religious language invoked by its
supporters, and concluded that an objective observer would
understand intelligent design to be a religious strategy “that
evolved from earlier forms of creationism.” Third, he
considered how a reasonable student in the Dover schools
would view the policy. Looking at the impressionable nature
of the students, the specific language of the disclaimer, and
the circumstances surrounding the classroom presentation of
the disclaimer, the judge found that “an objective student
would view the disclaimer as a strong official endorsement
of religion or a religious viewpoint.” Fourth, he concluded
that reasonable adults in the Dover community would reach
the same conclusion, because the board defended the policy
in a very public fashion through community meetings and a
widely circulated newsletter that described the policy in
expressly religious terms.
Although Judge Jones could have ended his analysis at
this point, he nonetheless proceeded to consider two other
issues that he deemed important to evaluating the constitutionality of the board’s policy. Thus, the opinion’s fifth
conclusion was that intelligent design is not science. The
judge rested this determination on his judgment that
intelligent design fails to follow the ground rules of science
by relying on supernatural explanations, that it uses “the
same flawed and illogical contrived dualism that doomed
creation science in the 1980s,” and that it has been
completely rejected by the scientific community. Finally,
finding that “the better practice in this Circuit is for this
Court to also evaluate the challenged conduct separately
under the Lemon test,” Judge Jones ended his opinion by
finding that the Dover policy independently failed to pass
constitutional muster because the school board that enacted
the policy was animated by the primary purpose of
advancing religion. On this score, the judge canvassed with
painstaking detail the events leading up to the adoption of
the school board’s policy—including various public meetings
and the donation of sixty copies of the intelligent design
textbook Of Pandas and People to the school district—and
concluded that the board’s purported secular purposes were
in fact a “sham.”
It is somewhat difficult at this time to assess the
future impact of the Kitzmiller decision on the intelligent
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design movement as a whole. On the one hand, the
decision has precedential value in only one small district
in central Pennsylvania and therefore does not prohibit
another school district in some other area of the country
from experimenting with intelligent design in its public
schools. Thus, if a school district in Kansas or Ohio or
Utah wants to introduce intelligent design into its science
classrooms, Kitzmiller erects no legal barrier. On the other
hand, the court’s careful and detailed fact-finding, along
with its persuasive and impressively complete legal
analysis, will likely make school districts around the
nation think twice (at least) about whether bringing
intelligent design into their biology classes would really
be worth the risks.
Judge Jones’s opinion is too comprehensive to provide
any type of exhaustive analysis here, but it is worth pausing
to emphasize a few of the more important aspects of the
decision. For one thing, Judge Jones appropriately spent
most of his effort in the opinion applying the endorsement
test to the school board’s policy, a move that is not
obviously dictated by the Supreme Court’s case law.
Although the Court has invoked the endorsement test in
all sorts of cases involving challenges to many types of
government action, including school funding and school
prayer, the test is most relevant and useful to evaluating the
constitutionality of religious displays, such as crèches,
crosses, and the like, which send the message that
government is favoring religion. Thus, the board argued
in the case that the endorsement test was inapplicable to a
curricular policy like the one at issue, especially given that
the Court did not apply the test in either Epperson or
Edwards, the two evolution cases previously to reach the
Court.
Judge Jones’s response to this argument was typically
comprehensive and compelling. Not only did the judge
make the obvious point that Edwards and Epperson
predated the Court’s adoption of the endorsement test, but
he also noted that Edwards in fact did mention the
endorsement idea; that the Court, having ruled against the
government on purpose grounds in that case, would
probably not have applied the endorsement test even if
the test had existed at the time; and that both the Supreme
Court and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals have
consistently applied the endorsement test in cases not
involving religious displays. But perhaps most importantly,
the judge understood that the endorsement test is the test
best suited to evaluating a policy such as the one adopted
by the Dover School Board, because such a policy is
problematic, more than anything else because it sends the
harmful message that the government wants to change the
curriculum to place a stamp of approval on a particular
religious belief. The question of whether the school board
had endorsed a religious message by adopting its intelligent
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design policy was therefore the central issue in the case,
and Judge Jones rightly recognized it as such.
Of course, Judge Jones did not stop writing after
finishing his endorsement analysis, and his decision to
consider the purpose inquiry under the Lemon test as well
was insightful and shrewd. Not only does the application of
both tests make the decision more difficult to overturn in
the unlikely case of an appeal (since the reviewing court
would have to find the judge’s analysis incorrect on both
counts), but it also insulates the decision in the not entirely
unlikely case that the newly constituted Supreme Court
does away with the endorsement test. With the test holding
on by only one vote, it is certainly possible that the test,
which has been the object of substantial judicial and
scholarly criticism (for example, McConnell 1990; Smith
1989), will be discarded by today’s more conservative
Court. If Judge Jones had not decided the case on both
endorsement and purpose grounds, a decision by the
Supreme Court to get rid of the endorsement test would
leave the Kitzmiller decision on shaky ground indeed. This
way, the Court would have to get rid of both the
endorsement and the Lemon test for the judge’s decision
to lose force. Although this too is not impossible, as the
Lemon test has also been widely criticized, it is far more
unlikely that the Court would reject both prevailing tests
than just one.
Finally, it should be of no surprise to anyone familiar
with reading legal opinions that one of the judge’s more
astute and important conclusions can be found in a
footnote. At trial, the school board had argued “vigorously”
that the act of reading the evolution disclaimer in front of
the classroom did not constitute the teaching of intelligent
design but rather simply made the “students aware of it.”
As such, the board argued, the policy could not have
violated the Establishment Clause. The judge rightly
rejected this argument with a two-part response. First, he
argued that the Establishment Clause not only prohibits the
teaching of religion, but also forbids the government from
endorsing or advancing religion generally, which can be
accomplished by actions in the classroom short of teaching.
But more fundamentally, the judge also accepted the
argument, advanced by various teachers at the trial, that
reading the disclaimer is in fact itself teaching. As the judge
found: “[A]n educator reading the disclaimer is engaged in
teaching, even if it is colossally bad teaching… The
disclaimer is a ‘mini-lecture’ providing substantive misconceptions about the nature of science, evolution, and ID
which ‘facilitates learning’” (Kitzmiller 727n7). This notion
that, given the teacher’s authoritative position in the
classroom, nearly everything he or she does there is in
some real and important sense “teaching” is perhaps a
subtle point, but it is surely true and potentially an
important legal conclusion. Like so much in the opinion,
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this footnote demonstrates that Judge Jones had an
impressively firm grasp not only on the formal legal issues
raised by the school board’s flawed policy, but on the realworld stakes it involved as well.

Academic Freedom
Advocates of intelligent design’s constitutionality often
argue that public school teachers have a First Amendment
academic freedom right to teach intelligent design even if
the school or school board has prohibited teachers from
discussing the topic. For example, Francis Beckwith has
argued that “bringing into the classroom relevant material
that is supplementary to the curriculum (and not a violation
of any other legal duties), when the public school teacher
has adequately fulfilled all of her curricular obligations, is
protected speech under the rubric of academic freedom”
(Beckwith 2003: 76). According to another intelligent
design supporter, “Public school teachers are protected in
their classroom discussions by free speech and academic
inquiry rights under the First Amendment speech rights”
(Miller 2001: 500). In support of this argument, intelligent
design advocates often cite language from Keyhishian v.
Board of Regents, where the Supreme Court opined that the
First Amendment “does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of
orthodoxy over the classroom.” In light of the rather
devastating opinion in Kitzmiller, intelligent design advocates have turned away from promoting district-wide
policies mandating the teaching of intelligent design and
moved instead toward encouraging individual teachers to
bring up the subject on their own, often through legislation
purporting to grant “academic freedom” to teachers to
present criticisms of evolution (Branch and Scott 2009).
But what if the school has a policy (or subsequently adopts
a policy) prohibiting such instruction? Would the teacher
have the right to teach intelligent design anyway?
Intelligent design advocates are certainly correct to claim
that the First Amendment places some limits on the state’s
authority to fire government employees, including public
school teachers, and that those teachers do not completely
give up their constitutional right to free speech when they
accept a government job. The Supreme Court, in Pickering
v. Board of Education, held that public school teachers have
a limited right (subject to a balancing test, in which the
court weighs the interest of the speaker against the
countervailing government interests) to speak as citizens
on matters of public concern without having to fear that
their employers will fire them or otherwise take negative
employment action against them. But this right to speak out
as citizens, in forums such as newspaper editorials or public
meetings, is completely different from the asserted right to
include material or views in the classroom in violation of
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orders from the government-controlled supervisory body.
This latter right simply does not exist. As the Supreme
Court recently explained, “When public employees make
statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees
are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes.” (Garcetti v. Ceballos 421).
The Court has never held that public secondary school
teachers have any independent “academic freedom” right.
The words academic freedom do not appear anywhere in
the Constitution, and although the phrase can occasionally
be found in non-binding language from the Supreme
Court, that Court has never relied upon an academic
freedom rationale to invalidate any government law or
practice. As the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals recently
explained, “[T]he Supreme Court has never set aside a
state regulation on the basis that it infringed a First
Amendment right to academic freedom…. [T]o the extent
it has constitutionalized a right of academic freedom at all,
[the Court] appears to have recognized only an institutional right of self-governance in academic affairs”
(Urofsky v. Gilmore 412).
Moreover, courts that have recently considered the issue
have generally rejected the notion that government employees have any First Amendment right to speak in their role
as employees in violation of the dictates of their democratically accountable supervisors. This means that even if a
teacher may have a right to speak out as a private citizen in
favor of intelligent design (or unprotected sex or communism or any other unpopular idea) in a public meeting or
newspaper editorial without fear of being fired, the same
teacher does not have the same right to advocate those ideas
inside the classroom, if the school (or school board or state)
has provided clear notice that the teacher may not teach
those subjects, or otherwise provided the teacher with
adequate due process protections. Again, the Fourth Circuit
made this clear when it explained that before applying the
Pickering balancing test to a public employee, the court
must decide whether the employee is speaking as a citizen
or as an employee: “This focus on the capacity of the
speaker recognizes the basic truth that speech by public
employees undertaken in the course of their job duties will
frequently involve matters of vital concern to the public,
without giving those employees a First Amendment right to
dictate to the state how they will do their jobs” (Urofsky v.
Gilmore 407). The Supreme Court recently agreed with this
analysis. (Garcetti v. Ceballos).
This is entirely sensible. If high-level government officials
cannot restrict the official speech of their employees, then
those employees (including teachers) would have nearcomplete authority to countermand the state’s official messages. The Fourth Circuit invokes the example of a formal
press conference where an assistant district attorney criticizes
his boss’s decision to pursue a murder charge, but one can
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imagine an endless stream of analogous examples where
adopting this academic freedom argument would disrupt the
government’s functioning. Should the president’s press
secretary be free to criticize the administration’s social policy?
Should a scientist from the Environmental Protection Agency
be able to officially state that some type of pollution is far less
dangerous than the Administrator has recognized? Should a
state employment officer be able to officially speak out against
the state’s pro-labor policies? These examples demonstrate the
chaotic results of recognizing a First Amendment right for a
subordinate to speak in his or her official capacity on matters
of public concern.
Recognizing a strong First Amendment speech right for
state employees acting as employees would be just as
problematic in the public schools as it would be anywhere
else in the government. Intelligent design supporters do not
propose any principled way to limit their academic freedom
argument to the intelligent design context, which is unsurprising, since no principled limit exists. As a result, teachers
could teach their personal views on a whole smorgasbord of
controversial topics, and the school would be unable to stop
them. Teachers could supplement a sex education class with
their own views about how HIV is really transferred, suggest
that the federally funded abstinence lesson they just taught
is a “bunch of crapola,” mention at the end of their health
lesson that drugs are in fact “kind of a blast,” hint that the
horrors of the Holocaust have been a “bit overstated,” or
argue that slavery was a mutually beneficial economic
arrangement for blacks and whites alike.
Allowing government supervisors to control the official
statements of their subordinates ensures that government
decision-makers remain democratically accountable for the
official messages of the state. Those who speak on the
state’s behalf are ultimately speaking for its citizens, and
those citizens ought to be able to take some action if the
state decides to take an official position that the citizens
disagree with or find offensive. The electoral process gives
citizens this power, but only for the highest level officials.
From a democratic standpoint, then, it makes sense that
those highest level officials ought to have the final say with
respect to what messages the state will espouse (so long, of
course, that these messages do not otherwise violate the
Establishment Clause or any other part of the Constitution).
If the courts adopted the position urged by supporters of
intelligent design, then citizens would lose any real power
to hold the government accountable for its statements in
cases where an employee makes an official statement on a
controversial subject that contradicts the state’s own
message. So, if a public school teacher decides to teach
that the Holocaust never happened, the community should
have the power to pressure the school board to prohibit the
teacher from advancing this view in the classroom. If the
board can control the teacher’s speech, and the board agrees
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with the community, then the board can fire the teacher if the
teacher persists in teaching the objectionable viewpoint. If the
board, on the other hand, decides not to reprimand the teacher,
the community can remove the relevant members from the
board at the next election. But if the teacher possesses a First
Amendment right to say what he or she wants, there will be
nothing that the community can do to stop the teacher from
continuing to engage in the unwanted speech.
Some scholars, such as Beckwith, argue only that a teacher
has the right to supplement the existing evolution curriculum
with intelligent design theory, rather than that a teacher has a
First Amendment right to replace the prescribed curriculum
by teaching intelligent design theory instead of evolution
(Beckwith 2003: 76). This distinction makes no difference,
however. There is no reason to think that the analysis should
be any different just because the employee first says what
she is supposed to say before putting forth her own opinion.
A First Amendment rule allowing supplementation of the
curriculum but not replacement of curricular content would
still undermine the functioning of government and obstruct
the lines of democratic accountability. Should the president’s press secretary really be able to officially state that
“the president believes his social policy is just, but he is
sadly mistaken”? Should the First Amendment really protect
a public school teacher who wants to tell his class that,
“Most people believe that the Holocaust happened, but I
have to say that the evidence looks a little thin to me,” or
“the principal thinks you shouldn’t have sex, but I think he’s
sort of overreacting,” if the community strongly disagrees
with these statements?
Finally, it is worth emphasizing that nothing said here is
intended to suggest that schools should generally restrict
what their teachers may say in the classroom. Strong
educational policy arguments surely exist for allowing
teachers wide latitude to teach the material they wish in
whatever way they want, even if sometimes their methods
or materials may be controversial. Providing teachers this
freedom also sends the essential message that teachers are
respected professionals whose work is vital to the effective
functioning of a democracy and the well-being of its
citizens. Indeed, probably in almost all cases, school boards
should allow teachers great leeway to do what they want
when they are in front of their classes. This conclusion,
however, is based on sound educational policy, not
constitutional law. Taking the position that schools should
usually allow teachers to supplement the curriculum with
their own views is far different from saying that teachers
have a First Amendment right to supplement the curriculum
with their own controversial viewpoints in those isolated
cases where the community strongly opposes that viewpoint. The latter purported “right” is unsupported by
constitutional text or precedent and contrary to common
sense and the ideals of the political community.
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Conclusion
The current dispute over teaching intelligent design in public
school classrooms is the most recent chapter of the longstanding controversy over how schools ought to present the
theory of evolution in their science classes. From time to
time, democratically elected majorities have succeeded in
implementing policies intended to undermine the teaching of
solid science. Each time this has happened, however, these
classroom initiatives have failed in the nation’s courtrooms.
The judges sitting in these courtrooms have uniformly
realized that given evolution’s commanding support in the
scientific community, attempts to weaken evolution’s status
in the classroom are constitutionally suspect. As long as
evolution continues to hold the dominant position in the
scientific community that it has occupied for most of the past
century, courts will likely continue to look at attempts to
discredit it with similar disfavor.
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